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Abstract. The model theory of a first-order logic called N4 is intro-
duced. N4 does not eliminate double negations, as classical logic does,
but instead reduces fourfold negations. N4 is very close to classical logic:
N4 has two truth values; implications are, in N4 like in classical logic,
material; and negation distributes over compound formulas in N4 as it
does in classical logic. Results suggest that the semantics of normal logic
programs is conveniently formalized in N4: Classical logic Herbrand in-
terpretations generalize straightforwardly to N4; the classical minimal
Herbrand model of a positive logic program coincides with its unique
minimal N4 Herbrand model; the stable models of a normal logic pro-
gram and its so-called complete minimal N4 Herbrand models coincide.
1 Introduction
This paper first introduces the (classical style) model theory of a first-order logic
called N4. The salient characteristic of N4 is that it does not eliminate double
negations as classical logic does (in N4, ¬¬F is not logically equivalent to F
and ¬¬¬F is not logically equivalent to ¬F ), but instead it reduces fourfold
negations (in N4, ¬¬¬¬F is logically equivalent to ¬¬F ). The name N4 stresses
that fourfold negations are reduced.
Despite its nonstandard treatment of negation, N4 is very close to classical
logic. Like classical logic, N4 has two truth values, its implication is material (in
N4, A→ B is logically equivalent to ¬A∨B), and the truth value of a formula is
defined recursively in terms of the truth values of its subformulas. Most logical
consequences of classical logic hold also in N4. In particular, negation distributes
over compound formulas in N4 as it does in classical logic. Also, in N4 F logically
implies ¬¬F (but the converse does not hold) and three laws of excluded middle
hold (F ∨ ¬F , ¬F ∨ ¬¬F , and ¬¬F ∨ ¬¬¬F are always true but F ∨ ¬¬¬F
might be false in some so-called incomplete N4 interpretations). Furthermore, a
classical logic model of a set S of formulas is also a N4 model of S.
This paper investigates formalizing the semantics of normal logic programs
using N4. A few results suggest that N4 is convenient for this purpose. Classical
⋆ Originally published in proc. PCL 2002, a FLoC workshop; eds. Hendrik Decker, Dina
Goldin, Jørgen Villadsen, Toshiharu Waragai (http://floc02.diku.dk/PCL/).
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logic Herbrand interpretations generalize straightforwardly to N4 as interpreta-
tions characterized by the ground atoms and the doubly negated ground atoms
(instead of only the ground atoms) they satisfy. The classical minimal Herbrand
model of a positive logic program coincides with its (unique) minimal N4 Her-
brand model. Every normal logic program has (in general many) minimal N4
Herbrand models. The stable models of a normal logic program [8] coincide with
its so-called complete minimal N4 Herbrand models.
This paper is structured as follows. The next section, Section 2, recalls a
few syntax notions and introduces terminology and notations. Section 3 defines
the model theory of N4 and gives a few results on logical consequence in N4.
Section 4 is devoted to N4 Herbrand interpretations. In Section 5, the minimal
N4 Herbrand models of normal logic programs are defined and investigated.
Section 6 discusses the intuitive meaning of N4. Section 7 addresses perspectives
and related work. The proofs are given in Appendix.
2 Syntax, Terminology, and Notations
N4 syntax is that of classical first-order logic. If L is a first-order language, its
(non-empty) set of constants will be noted ConstL, the set of its n-ary (n ≥ 1)
function symbols will be noted Funn
L
, and the set of its n-ary (n ≥ 0) predicate
symbols will be noted Reln
L
. A first-order language is assumed to include the
falsum ⊥, the unary connective ¬, the binary connectives ∧ ∨, and the quantifiers
∀ ∃.
In the following, a fixed first-order language L is assumed. The terms, ground
terms, Herbrand universe, atoms or atomic formulas, formulas, closed formulas,
etc. of L are defined as usual. Note that the falsum ⊥ is not an atom. n-fold
(n ≥ 0) negations will be noted ¬n. A formula F is in prefix negation form if
F = ¬nG (n ≥ 0) and no negations occur in G. Two additional connectives,
→ and ↔, and the verum ⊤ are defined as follows as shorthand notations:
(F → G) := (¬F ∨G), (F ↔ G) := ((¬F ∨G) ∧ (¬G ∨ F )), and ⊤ := ¬⊥.
The following unusual notion of literal will be used.
Definition 1 (N4 literal). A N4 literal is an atom, a negated atom, a doubly
negated atom, or a threefold negated atom. A positive N4 literal is an atom or
a doubly negated atom. A negative N4 literal is a negated atom or a threefold
negated atom.
A positive program clause (general program clause, resp.) in L is an expression
of the form A← B1, . . . , Bn (n ≥ 0), where A is an atom of L and B1, . . . , and
Bn are atoms (atoms or negated atoms, resp.) of L. A positive (normal or general,
resp.) logic program in L is a finite set of positive (general, resp.) program clauses
in L.
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3 N4 Model Theory
N4 interpretations resemble that of classical logic. A significant difference is that
they assign relations not only to predicate symbols, as classical logic interpreta-
tions do, but also to doubly negated predicate symbols.
Definition 2 (N4 Interpretation). A N4 interpretation I of L is a pair
(DI , valI) such that
1. DI is a non-empty set, called the domain or universe of I.
2. valI is an assignment defined as follows:
2.1 valI(c) ∈ DI, for c ∈ConstL.
2.2 valI(f) is a function from D
n
I
into DI, for f ∈ Fun
n
L (n ≥ 1).
2.3 valI(p) ∈ {true, false} and valI(¬2p) ∈ {true, false} such that if
valI(p) = true, then valI(¬2p) = true, for p ∈ Rel
0
L.
2.4 valI(p) ⊆ valI(¬
2p) ⊆ D nI , for p ∈ Rel
n
L (n ≥ 1).
Thus, in a N4 interpretation only one of the three truth assignments of Figure 1
are possible for a propositional variable p and the positive N4 literal ¬2p. Note
that if p is true, then ¬2p is also true.
A classical logic interpretation trivially induces a N4 interpretation: It suffices
to assign the same truth value or relation to each doubly negated predicate
symbol ¬2p as to p. However, not every N4 interpretation corresponds to a
classical logic interpretation. For example, the second line of Figure 1 is not
possible in classical logic.
p ¬2p
true true
false true
false false
Fig. 1. Possible valuations of p and ¬2p in N4 interpretations
In N4, variable and term assignments are defined like in classical logic. Both
definitions are recalled, so as to introduce the notations used later.
Definition 3 (Variable Assignment). Let I be a N4 interpretation of L with
domain DI. A variable assignment V with respect to I assigns an element of
DI to each variable of L. If V is variable assignment with respect to I, x is
a variable, and d ∈ DI, then V [d/x] denotes the following variable assignment
with respect to I:
V [d/x] (y) :=
{
d if y = x
V(y) otherwise
4 Franc¸ois Bry
Definition 4 (Term Assignment). Let I = (DI , valI) be a N4 interpretation
of L and V a variable assignment with respect to I. The term assignment valI,V
with respect to I and V is defined as follows:
1. valI,V(x) = V(x), for x variable.
2. valI,V(c) = valI(c), for c ∈ ConstL.
3. valI,V(f(t1, . . . , tn)) = valI(f)(valI,V(t1), . . . , valI,V(tn)), for f ∈ Fun
n
L
(n ≥ 1) and t1, . . . tn terms.
p ¬p ¬2p ¬3p
true false true false
false true true false
false true false true
Fig. 2. Possible valuations of p, ¬p, ¬2p, and ¬3p in N4 interpretations
The truth value of a negated formula is defined in such a way, that Figure 1
can be completed as shown by Figure 2, i.e. ¬p negates p but not ¬2p and ¬3p
negates ¬2p but not p.
Definition 5 (Formula Valuation). Let I = (DI , valI) be a N4 interpretation
of L and V a variable assignment with respect to I. The valuation function valI,V
with respect to I and V is defined as follows:
1.1 valI,V(p) = true iff valI(p) = true, for p ∈ Rel
0
L and
valI,V(p(t1, . . . , tn)) = true iff (valI,V(t1), . . . , valI,V(tn)) ∈ valI(p), for
p ∈ RelnL (n ≥ 1) and t1, . . . , tn terms.
1.2 valI,V((F1 ∧ F2)) = true iff valI,V(F1) = true and valI,V(F2) = true.
1.3 valI,V((F1 ∨ F2)) = true iff valI,V(F1) = true or valI,V(F2) = true.
1.4 valI,V(∀xF ) = true iff for all d ∈ DI valI,V[d/x](F ) = true.
1.5 valI,V(∃xF ) = true iff for some d ∈ DI valI,V[d/x](F ) = true.
2.1 valI,V(¬⊥) = true,
valI,V(¬p) = true iff valI,V(p) 6= true, for p ∈ Rel
n
L (n ≥ 0), and valI,V(¬p(t1, . . . , tn)) =
true iff (valI,V(t1), . . . , valI,V(tn)) 6∈ valI(p), for p ∈ Rel
n
L (n ≥ 1).
2.2 valI,V(¬(F1 ∧ F2)) = valI,V((¬F1 ∨ ¬F2)).
2.3 valI,V(¬(F1 ∨ F2)) = valI,V((¬F1 ∧ ¬F2)).
2.4 valI,V(¬∀xF ) = valI,V(∃x¬F ).
2.5 valI,V(¬∃xF ) = valI,V(∀x¬F ).
3.1 valI,V(¬2p) = true iff valI(¬2p) = true, for p ∈ Rel
0
L and
valI,V(¬2p(t1, . . . , tn)) = true iff (valI,V(t1), . . . , valI,V(tn)) ∈ valI(¬2p),
for p ∈ RelnL (n ≥ 1) and t1, . . . , tn terms.
3.2 valI,V(¬2(F1 ∧ F2)) = valI,V((¬2F1 ∧ ¬2F2)).
3.3 valI,V(¬2(F1 ∨ F2)) = valI,V((¬2F1 ∨ ¬2F2)).
3.4 valI,V(¬2∀xF ) = valI,V(∀x¬2F ).
3.5 valI,V(¬2∃xF ) = valI,V(∃x¬2F ).
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4 valI,V(¬3F ) = true iff valI,V(¬2F ) 6= true.
5 valI,V(F ) = false iff valI,V(F ) 6= true.
On can prove as follows that valI,V is a total function over the formulas of L. For
each formula F exactly one of the clauses 1.1 to 4 of Definition 5 apply. (Which
clause applies to a formula depends on its structure.) Therefore, valI,V(.) = true
defines a partial function. Because of clause 5, valI,V is total. Since valI,V is a
total function, Definition 5 correctly specifies the valuation of formulas in an N4
interpretation.
Definition 5 differs from its classical logic counterpart as follows. To obtain
the definition of classical logic, drop clauses 2.1 through 3.5 and replace clause
4 by:
4’ valI,V(¬F ) = true iff valI,V(F ) 6= true.
Note that, although clauses 2.1 through 3.5 are not needed in the classical logic
counterpart of Definition 5, they hold in classical logic. Note also that the elim-
ination of double negation follows from clause 4’.
Properties of N4 are given in the rest of this section. From now on, I =
(DI , valI) denotes a N4 interpretation of L, V a variable assignment with respect
to I, and F , F1, F2, F3, G, G1, and G2 formulas of L.
Proposition 1.
1. valI,V(⊥) = false and valI,V(⊤) = true
2. valI,V((F1 ∧ F2)) = valI,V((F2 ∧ F1)).
3. valI,V((F1 ∨ F2)) = valI,V((F2 ∨ F1)).
4. valI,V((F1 ∧ (F2 ∨ F3))) = valI,V(((F1 ∧ F2) ∨ (F1 ∧ F3))).
5. valI,V((F1 ∨ (F2 ∧ F3))) = valI,V(((F1 ∨ F2) ∧ (F1 ∨ F3))).
6. valI,V((F1 ∧ (F2 ∧ F3))) = valI,V(((F1 ∧ F2) ∧ F3)).
7. valI,V((F1 ∨ (F2 ∨ F3))) = valI,V(((F1 ∨ F2) ∨ F3)).
8. If valI,V(G1) = valI,V(G2), then
valI,V((F ∨G1)) = valV,I((F ∨G2))
valI,V((F ∧G1)) = valV,I((F ∧G2))
valI,V(¬G1) = valV,I(¬G2)
9. valI,V(¬∀xF ) = valI,V(∃x¬F )
10. valI,V(¬∃xF ) = valI,V(∀x¬F )
Proposition 2. If F is in prefix negation form and for all k ∈ N F 6= ¬2k+1G,
then valI,V(F ) 6= valI,V(¬F ).
As Figures 2 and 3 show, Proposition 2 does not generalize to all formulas.
Proposition 3.
1. Fourfold negation reduction: valI,V(¬4F ) = valI,V(¬2F )
2. Laws of excluded middle:
valI,V((F ∨ ¬F )) = valI,V((¬F ∨ ¬2F )) = valI,V((¬2F ∨ ¬3F )) = true
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p ¬p ¬2p ¬3p
false true true false
Fig. 3. A N4 interpretation falsifying ¬p ∨ p
3. Laws of excluded contradiction:
valI,V((¬F ∧ ¬2F )) = valI,V((¬2F ∧ ¬3F )) = valI,V((F ∧ ¬3F )) = false
Although F ∨¬F , ¬F ∨¬2F , and ¬2F ∨¬3F are true in all N4 interpretations
(Proposition 3), F ∨ ¬3F might be false in some N4 interpretations. This is for
example the case of F = p in the N4 interpretation of Figure 3.
Proposition 4. If F is in prefix negation form, for all k ∈ N F 6= ¬2k+1G,
and valI,V(F ) = true, then valI,V(¬2F ) = true.
In N4, implications are defined in terms of negation and disjunction. In con-
trast to classical logic, in N4 not all disjunctions are expressible in terms of
implications. For some formulas F1 and F2, N
4 interpretations I, and variable
assignments V , valI,V((¬F1 → F2)) = true and valI,V((F1 ∨F2)) = false. This
is the case, e.g. if F1 and F2 are propositional variables and if I evaluates F1
and F2 as shown on Figure 4.
F1 ¬
2F1 F2 ¬
2F2
false true false true
false true false false
Fig. 4. A N4 interpretation s.t. (¬F1 → F2) is true and (F1 ∨ F2) false
Example 1. Let F1 = (¬p→ p). According to Definition 5, in N4 F1 is logically
equivalent to (¬2p∨ p). Figure 5 gives the possible valuations of p, ¬p, ¬2p and
¬3p in N4 interpretations in which F1 and F2 are true. In classical logic, only
the first of these valuations is possible.
p ¬p ¬2p ¬3p
true false true false
false true true false
Fig. 5. N4 interpretations satisfying (¬p→ p)
Example 2. Let S2 = {(¬a → b), (¬b → a)}. In N4, S2 is logically equivalent to
{(¬2a ∨ b), (¬2b ∨ a)}. Figure 6 gives the two possible valuations of a, ¬2a, b,
and ¬2b in N4 interpretations in which S2 is true.
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a ¬2a b ¬2b
true true true true
true true false true
true true false false
false true true true
false true false true
false false true true
Fig. 6. N4 interpretations satisfying S2 = {(¬a→ b), (¬b→ a)}
Example 3. Let S3 = {(¬p → p), (p → p)}. In N4, S3 is logically equivalent to
{(¬2p∨ p), (¬p∨ p)}. Figure 7 gives the possible valuations of p, ¬p, and ¬2p in
N4 interpretations in which S3 is true.
p ¬p ¬2p
true false true
false true true
Fig. 7. N4 interpretation satisfying S3 = {(¬p→ p), (p→ p)}
While a classical logic interpretation can be seen as N4 interpretations, some
N4 interpretations have no counterparts in classical logic. Such N4 interpretations
are conveniently characterized as follows.
Definition 6 (In/Complete N4 Interpretation). A N4 interpretation I of L
is F -incomplete, if for some variable assignment V with respect to I valI,V(F ) 6=
valI,V(¬2F ). Otherwise, it is F -complete. A N4 interpretation is incomplete, if
it is F -incomplete for some formula F . Otherwise, it is complete.
Proposition 5. The following assertions are equivalent:
1. I induces a classical logic interpretation.
2. I is complete.
3. For all atoms A, I is A-complete.
Definition 7 (N4 Model). I is a N4 model of F , if valI,V(F ) = true for
some variable assignment V with respect to I. A formula is N4 satisfiable if it
has a N4 model. A formula is N4 falsifiable, if there exists a N4 interpretation
in which this formula is false.
“I is a N4 model of F” will be noted I |=N4 F . “F2 logically follows from F1
in N4” will be noted F1 |=N4 F2.
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4 N4 Herbrand Interpretations
The classical definitions of the Herbrand base and Herbrand interpretations gen-
erated by a subset of the Herbrand base extend straightforwardly to N4.
Definition 8 (N4 Herbrand Interpretation). Let UL denote the Herbrand
universe of L, i.e. the set of all ground terms of L. A N4 interpretation I =
(D, val) is a N4 Herbrand interpretation if
1. D = UL
2. For all c ∈ ConstL, val(c) = c.
3. For all n ∈ N \ {0}, f ∈ Fun0L, and (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ U
n
L
, val(f)(t1, . . . , tn) =
f(t1, . . . , tn).
Definition 9 (N4 Herbrand Base). The N4 Herbrand base B2
L
of L is the set
of all positive ground N4 literals of L. M ⊆ B2
L
is closed if for all atom A ∈M ,
¬2A ∈M .
Thus, if BL denotes the classical Herbrand base of a first-order language L,
then in BL ⊆ B2L and (if L has some predicate symbols) BL 6= B
2
L
.
Definition 10 (H2(M)). Let M be a closed subset of B2
L
. The unique N4 Her-
brand interpretation H2(M) such that for all positive ground N4 literals L ∈ B2L
H2(M) |=N4 L iff L ∈M
is the N4 Herbrand interpretation generated by M .
The uniqueness of H2(M) asserted in Definition 10 follows immediately from
Definition 8.
The order on classical interpretations extends to N4 interpretations.
Definition 11 (Order on N4 Interpretations). Let I1 = (D1, val1) and
I2 = (D2, val2) be two N4 interpretations of L. I1 is a sub-interpretation of I2,
noted I1 ⊆ I2, if
1. D1 ⊆ D2,
2. For all c ∈ ConstL val1(c) = val2(c),
3. For all n ∈ N \ {0}, f ∈ Funn
L
, and (d1, . . . , dn) ∈ D n1 ,
val1(f)(d1, . . . , dn) = val2(f)(d1, . . . , dn),
4. For all p ∈ Rel0
L
, val1(p) = val2(p) and val1(¬2p) = val2(¬2p).
5. For all n ∈ N \ {0} and p ∈ Reln
L
, val1(p) = val2(p) ∩D n1 and val1(¬
2p) =
val2(¬2p) ∩D n1 .
If in addition D1 6= D2, then I1 is a proper sub-interpretation of I2.
Definition 12 (Intersection of N4 Interpretations). Let {Ik | k ∈ C} be a
collection of N4 interpretations of L such that
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1. Ik = (Dk, valk).
2. C 6= ∅. Let k0 be an element of C.
3. D =
⋂
k∈C Dk 6= ∅.
4. For all c ∈ ConstL, k ∈ C, l ∈ C, valk(c) = vall(c).
5. For all n ∈ N\{0}, f ∈ Fun0L, (d1, . . . , dn) ∈ D, k ∈ C, l ∈ C, valk(f)(d1, . . . , dn) =
vall(f)(d1, . . . , dn).
⋂
k∈C Ik = (D, val) is the N
4 interpretation with universe D =
⋂
k∈C Dk defined
by:
1. For all c ∈ ConstL, val(c) = valk0(c).
2. For all n ∈ N\{0}, f ∈ Fun0L, (d1, . . . , dn) ∈ D, k ∈ C, l ∈ C, val(f)(d1, . . . , dn) =
valk0(f)(d1, . . . , dn).
3. For all p ∈ Rel0L, val(p) = false if valk(p) = false for some k ∈ C, val(p) =
true otherwise, and
val(¬2p) = false if valk(¬2p) false for some k ∈ C, val(¬2p) = true
otherwise.
4. For all n ∈ N, p ∈ RelnL, val(p) =
⋂
k∈C valk(p) and val(¬
2p) =
⋂
k∈C valk(¬
2p).
Proposition 6. Let {Sk | k ∈ C} be a collection of subsets of the N4 Herbrand
base B2
L
.
H2(
⋂
k∈C
Sk) =
⋂
k∈C
H2(Sk)
Let Pc(B2L) be the set of closed subsets of B
2
L
. Since Pc(B2L) is obviously
closed under intersection and union, (Pc(B
2
L),⊆) is a complete lattice. It follows
from Propositions 6 that (Pc(B2L),⊆) induces a complete lattice (the order of
which is also noted ⊆) over the N4 Herbrand interpretations of L. Referring to
this ordering, the minimal N4 Herbrand models of a set of formulas which is
satisfiable over N4 Herbrand interpretations are well-defined. Thus, if M is a
closed subset of B2
L
and S is a set of formulas of L, then H2(M) is a minimal
N4 Herbrand model of S iff:
1. H2(M) |=N4 S.
2. For all B closed subset of M such that B 6= M , H2(B) 6|=N4 S.
The following characterization of minimal N4 Herbrand models is used in the
next section.
Proposition 7. Let S be a set of formulas of L and M a closed subset of B2
L
.
Let M˜ = {¬L | L ∈ B2
L
\M}. H2
L
(M) is a minimal N4 Herbrand model of S iff
1. H2
L
(M) |=N4 S.
2. For all L ∈M , S ∪ M˜ |=N4 L.
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5 Minimal N4 Herbrand Models of Normal Logic
Programs
Since double negations are not eliminated in N4, the following interpretation of
program clauses as formulas will be used.
Definition 13 (N4 clausal form). The N4 clause associated with a general
program clause A← B1, . . . , Bn is the (closed) formula
∀x1 . . . ∀xk (. . . (A ∨ ¬B1) ∨ . . . ∨ ¬Bn)
where x1, . . . , xk are the variables occurring in the literals A,B1, . . . , and Bn.
A N4 interpretation I satisfies a general program clause C, if I is a N4 model
of the N4 clause associated with C. Otherwise, it falsifies it. A interpretation
I satisfies (or is a N4 model) of a normal logic program, if it satisfies all its
program clauses. Otherwise, it falsifies it.
Thus, the N4 clause associated with the program clause a(x, y) ← b(x, z),
¬c(z), d(y) is the formula (⋆) ∀x∀y∀z (((a(x, y)∨¬b(x, z))∨¬2c(z))∨¬d(y)). Note
that, in (⋆), double negations are not eliminated. Note also that (⋆) is logically
equivalent (in N4 and in classical logic) to ∀x∀y∀z (((b(x, z) ∧ ¬c(z)) ∧ d(y))→
a(x, y)).
Every normal logic program has a N4 Herbrand model, since H(B2
L
) is a
model of every normal logic program. Indeed, H(B2
L
) satisfies every N4 clause
associated with a general program clause, because such a clause contains at
least one positive N4 literal. Note that the classical minimal Herbrand model
of a positive logic program corresponds to its (unique) minimal N4 Herbrand
model.
The following examples suggest that complete minimal N4 Herbrand models
might convey a logic program’s intuitive meaning. The first two examples are
odd, resp. even length recursion cycles through negation.
Example 4. Let P1 = {p ← ¬p}. In N4, P1 is logically equivalent to S1 =
{(¬2p∨p)}. The unique minimal N4 Herbrand model of P1 is H2L({¬
2p}). Figure
8 gives the valuations of p, ¬p, and ¬2p in this model (compare with Figure 5).
Note that H2L({¬
2p}) is incomplete.
p ¬p ¬2p
false false true
Fig. 8. Minimal N4 model of p← ¬p
Example 5. Let P2 = {a ← ¬b ; b ← ¬a}. In N4 , P2 is logically equivalent
to S2 = {(¬2b ∨ a), (¬2a ∨ b)}. The minimal N4 Herbrand models of P2 are
An Almost Classical Logic 11
a ¬a ¬2a b ¬b ¬2b
true false true false true false
false false true false false true
false true false true false true
Fig. 9. Minimal N4 models of P = {b← ¬a ; a← ¬b}
H2
L
({a,¬2a}), H2
L
({¬2a,¬2b}), and H2
L
({b,¬2b}). Figure 9 gives the valuations
of the N4 literals in these models (compare with Figure 6). H2
L
({¬2a,¬2b}) is
incomplete.
Example 6. Let P3 = P1 ∪ P2 = {p ← ¬p,¬a ; a ← ¬b ; b ← ¬a}. The
minimal N4 Herbrand models of P3 are H2L({a,¬
2a}), H2
L
({¬2a,¬2b}), and
H2
L
({¬2p, b,¬2b}). Compare with the previous examples.
Example 7. Let P4 = P1 ∪ {p ← p}. In N4, P4 is logically equivalent to S4 =
{(¬2p∨ p), (¬p∨ p)}. It follows from Proposition 3 (2) that S4 is logically equiv-
alent to S1 = {(¬2p∨p)}. Thus, P1 and P4 have the same minimal N4 Herbrand
model H2
L
({¬2p}).
Proposition 8. Let S be a (possibly infinite) set of ground (general) program
clauses. If M is a closed subset of B2
L
, let SimpM (S) denote the set of ground
general program clauses obtained from S as follows:
1. First delete all clauses whose bodies contain some negative literal ¬A with
A ∈M .
2. Second, delete the negative literals from the bodies of the remaining clauses.
Let A be a ground atom. S ∪ M˜ |=N4 A iff SimpM (S) |= A.
Proposition 8 does not hold in classical logic. Consider for example P1 =
{p← ¬p}. Assume that p is the only predicate symbol of L and letM = {p,¬2p}.
In classical logic P1 ∪ M˜ = P1 |= p but SimpM (P1) = ∅ 6|= p.
Proposition 9. Let P be a normal logic program. A N4 Herbrand model of P
is stable iff it is complete and minimal.
6 Perspectives and Related Work
The approach presented here seems to enjoy many of the strong and weak princi-
ples of [3,4]. E.g. “Cut”, “Cautious Monotonicity”, and the “Principle of Partial
Evaluation” result directly from the the classical-style evaluation function (Def-
inition 5), “Relevance” from N4 treatment of double negations and from model
minimality (Proposition 8). This deserves deeper investigations.
12 Franc¸ois Bry
The model theory of N4 presented in this paper needs to be complemented
with a proof theory. First investigations indicate that natural deduction and the
tableau method well adapt to N4. A tableau method for N4 would provide with a
basis for defining a fixpoint-like generation of the minimal N4 Herbrand models
of a normal logic program. Also, it would be useful for program development
to have at disposal a backward reasoning method able to detect whether, for
some instance Gσ of a goal G, a logic program has a Gσ-incomplete minimal N4
Herbrand model.
Publications on the semantics of normal logic programs are numerous – cf. the
surveys [2,3,4,5,1,6]. For space reasons, these publications cannot be discussed
here in detail. Most of them can be roughly classified in ad hoc definitions
of models (such as [8]) for (restricted or unrestricted) normal logic programs,
forward reasoning methods for computing models, approaches referring to non-
standard logics (often three-valued logics), and approaches based on program
transformations. The approach presented here is of the first and third types. Its
particularities are that it is based upon a notion of minimal Herbrand models
and that it refers to a nonstandard logic rather close to classical logic. Note
interesting similarites with the transformation-based approach of [7,11]. Note
also that N4 can be seen as a four-valued logic (the truth values of which can be
read “true”, “false”, “required”, and “not required”).
Aspects of the work presented here have been inspired from [9,10] as follows.
The interpretation of program clauses as N4 formulas (Definition 13) is remi-
niscent of their processing in [9]. The characterization of minimal N4 Herbrand
models (Proposition 7) is an adaptation to N4 of a result given in [10] for classical
logic.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
1. valI,V(⊥) = false iff (Def. 5 (5)) valI,V(⊥) 6= true. This holds, since none
of the cases of Def. 5 give rise to derive valI,V(⊥) = true.
valI,V(⊤) = valI,V(¬⊥) = true by Def. 5 (2.1).
2-10. Each statement follows from the corresponding property of the meta-language
in which Definition 5 is expressed.
Proof of Proposition 2:
The proof is by induction on the structure of F . Let k ∈ N and IH(G) denote:
“valI,V(G) 6= valI,V(¬G)”.
Basis cases:
F is an atom or F = ⊥. IH(⊥) holds since Def. 5 (2.1) and Prop. 1 (1).
Induction cases:
1. F = (F1 ∧ F2). Assume IH(F1) and IH(F2) (ind. hyp.). IH(F ) follows from
Def. 5 (1.2, 2.2), IH(F1) and IH(F2).
2. F = (F1 ∨ F2). Assume IH(F1) and IH(F2) (ind. hyp.).IH(F ) follows from
Def. 5 (1.3, 2.3), IH(F1) and IH(F2).
3. F = ∀xF1. Assume IH(F1) (ind. hyp.). IH(F ) follows from Def. 5 (1.4, 2.4)
and IH(F1).
4. F = ∃xF1. Assume IH(F1) (ind. hyp.). IH(F ) follows from Def. 5 (1.5, 2.5)
and IH(F1).
Proof of Proposition 3:
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1. valI,V(¬4F ) = true iff (Def. 5 (4)) valI,V(¬3F ) 6= true iff (Def. 5 (4))
valI,V(¬2F ) = true.
2. The proof is by induction on the structure of F . Let IH(G) denote: “valI,V((G∨
¬G)) = valI,V((¬G ∨ ¬2G)) = valI,V((¬2G ∨ ¬3G)) = true.”
Basis cases:
F is an atom or F = ⊥.
valI,V((F ∨ ¬F )) = true by Def. 5 (1.3, 2.1).
valI,V((¬F ∨ ¬2F )) = true by Def. 5 (1.3, 3.1).
valI,V((¬2F ∨ ¬3F )) = true by Def. 5 (1.3, 4).
Induction cases:
1. F = ¬F1. Assume IH(F1) (ind. hyp.).
valI,V((F ∨ ¬F )) = valI,V((¬F1 ∨ ¬2F1)) = true (IH(F1)).
valI,V((¬F ∨ ¬2F )) = valI,V((¬2F1 ∨ ¬3F1)) = true (IH(F1)).
By Def. 5 (3.3), Prop. 1 (1), and IH(F1):
valI,V((¬2F ∨ ¬3F )) = valI,V((¬3F1 ∨ ¬4F1)) =
valI,V(¬2(¬F1 ∨ ¬2F1)) = valI,V(¬2⊤) = true.
2. F = (F1 ∧ F2). Assume IH(F1) and IH(F2) (ind. hyp.).
By Def. 5 (3.3), Prop. 1, IH(F1), and IH(F2)
valI,V((F ∨ ¬F )) = valI,V(((F1 ∧ F2) ∨ ¬(F1 ∧ F2))) =
valI,V((((F1 ∨ ¬F1) ∨ F2) ∧ ((F2 ∨ ¬F2) ∨ F1))) =
valI,V(((⊤ ∨ F2) ∧ (⊤ ∨ F1)))) = true.
valI,V((¬F ∨ ¬2F )) = valI,V((¬(F1 ∧ F2) ∨ ¬2(F1 ∧ F2))) =
valI,V(((¬F1 ∨ ¬2F1) ∧ (¬F2 ∨ ¬2F2))) = valI,V((⊤ ∧ ⊤)) = true.
valI,V((¬2F ∨ ¬3F )) = valI,V((¬2(F1 ∧ F2) ∨ ¬3(F1 ∧ F2))) =
valI,V(((¬2F1 ∨ ¬3F1) ∧ (¬2F2 ∨ ¬3F2))) = valI,V((⊤ ∧ ⊤)) = true.
3. F = (F1 ∨ F2). The proof is similar to those of the preceding case.
6. F = ∀xF1. Assume IH(F1) (ind. hyp.). By Def. 5 (3.3), Prop. 1, and
IH(F1):
valI,V((F ∨ ¬F )) = valI,V((∀xF1 ∨ ¬∀xF1)) = valI,V(∀x(F1¬F1)) =
valI,V(∀x⊤) = valI,V(⊤) = true.
valI,V((¬F ∨ ¬2F )) = valI,V((¬∀xF1 ∨ ¬2∀xF1)) =
valI,V(∀x(¬F1 ∨ ¬2F1)) = valI,V(∀x⊤) = valI,V(⊤) = true.
valI,V((¬2F ∨ ¬3F )) = valI,V((¬∀xF1 ∨ ¬3∀xF1)) =
valI,V(∀x(¬2F1 ∨ ¬3F1)) = valI,V(∀x⊤) = valI,V(⊤) = true.
7. F = ∃xF1. The proof is similar to those of the preceding case.
Proof of Proposition 4:
First note that valI,V(¬
2⊤) = true since Def. 5 (4, 3.1). Assume valI,V(F ) =
true. Then, by Prop. 1 (8) valI,V(¬2F ) = valI,V(¬2⊤). By Def. 5 (4, 2.1),
valI,V(¬2⊤) = true. Hence, valI,V(¬2F ) = true.
Proof of Proposition 5:
1↔ 2: 2 is a rephrasing of 1.
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2→ 3: By definition of complete and A-complete N4 interpretations.
3 → 2: Let I be a N4 interpretation which is A-complete for all atoms A. The
proof is by induction on the structure of F .
Basis cases:
1. F = ⊥. By Prop. 1 (1), valI,V(⊥) = false and valI,V(¬⊥) = valI,V(⊤) =
true. Therefore, I is ⊥-complete.
2. F is an atom. I is F -complete, since by hypothesis, it is A-complete for all
atoms A.
Induction cases:
1. F = (F1 ∧ F2). Assume that I is F1-complete and F2-complete (ind. hyp.).
By Def. 5 (1.2, 3.2), valI,V(F ) = valI,V(¬2F ).
2. F = (F1 ∨ F2). Assume that I is F1-complete and F2-complete (ind. hyp.).
By Def. 5 (1.3, 3.3), valI,V(F ) = valI,V(¬2F ).
3. F = ∀xF1. Assume that I is F1-complete (ind. hyp.). By Prop. 1 (9, 10),
valI,V(F ) = valI,V(¬
2F ).
4. F = ∃xF1. Assume that I is F1-complete (ind. hyp.). By Prop. 1 (9, 10),
valI,V(F ) = valI,V(¬2F ).
5. F = ¬F1. Assume that I is F1-complete (ind. hyp.). By Prop. 1 (8) valI,V(F ) =
valI,V(¬F1) = valI,V(¬3F1) = valI,V(¬2F ).
Proof of Proposition 6:
As its classical logic counterparts, the result follows directly from the definition
of the intersection of interpretations (Def. 12).
Proof of Proposition 7:
Necessary condition: Assume that H2(M) is a minimal N4 Herbrand model
of S. Thus, 1 holds. If M = ∅, then 2 holds trivially. Otherwise, let L ∈M . Let
L˜ = ¬L. If S∪M˜ 6|=N4 L, then S∪M˜∪{L˜} has a N
4 Herbrand model, hence also a
minimal N4 Herbrand model, sayH2(N). By definition ofH2(N),H2(N) |=N4 L˜.
Therefore, H2(N) 6|=N4 L (Prop. 2), i.e. L 6∈ N . Since H
2(N) |=N4 S ∪ M˜ ,
N ⊆ M . Since L ∈ M \ N , N 6= M . This contradict the minimality of H2(M)
since H2(N) |=N4 S. Therefore, for all L ∈M , S ∪ M˜ |=N4 L, i.e. 2 holds.
Sufficient condition: Assume that 1 and 2 hold. If H2(M) is not a minimal N4
Herbrand model of S, then there exists a closed subset N ofM such that N 6= M
and H2(N) is a minimal N4 Herbrand model of S. Let N˜ = {¬L | L ∈ B2
L
\N}.
From the necessary condition, it follows that for all L ∈ N , S ∪ N˜ |=N4 L. Since
N ⊂ M , N 6= M , there exists L ∈ M \ N . By hypothesis 2, S ∪ M˜ |=N4 L.
Since N ⊂M , M˜ ⊂ N˜ . Therefore, S ∪ N˜ |=N4 L. But by definition, L ∈M \N .
Therefore, L˜ ∈ N˜ . Thus, both L and L˜ are true in every model of S ∪ N˜ , among
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others in H2(N). This contradicts Prop. 2. Therefore, H2(M) is a minimal N4
Herbrand model of S.
Proof of Proposition 8:
By definition of N4 interpretations (Def. 2), ¬2A 6|=N4 A for all ground atoms A.
Therefore, S ∪ M˜ |=N4 A for some ground atom A iff for all N
4 interpretation I
such that I 6|=N4 M , there exists a program clause C ∈ S such that:
1. A is the head of C.
2. For all positive body literal B of C, I |=N4 B.
3. For all negative body literals ¬B of C, I 6|=N4 B.
Thus, S ∪ M˜ |=N4 A for some ground atom A iff SimpM (S) |=N4 A. Since no
negative literal occur in the program clauses in SimpM (S), SimpM (S) |=N4 A
implies SimpM (S) |= A.
Proof of Proposition 9:
Let Ground(P) denote the set of ground instances of the program clauses of
a normal logic program P . A stable model of P [8] is a classical logic Her-
brand interpretation HL(M) (M ⊆ BL) such that, for all atoms A, A ∈ M iff
SimpM (Ground(P)) |= A.
If M ⊆ BL, let M = {¬A | A ∈M} and M = {¬2A | A ∈M}.
Necessary condition: Let HL(M) be a stable model of P (i.e.M ⊆ BL). Since
HL(M) |= P , H2L(M ∪M) is a complete N
4 model of P . Since H2
L
(M ∪M) is
complete, (⋆) for all A ∈ BL, H2L(M ∪M) |=N4 ¬
2A iff H2
L
(M ∪M) |=N4 A.
Let A ∈ M . Since HL(M) is a stable model of P , SimpM (Ground(P)) |= A.
Therefore, SimpM (Ground(P)) |=N4 A. It follows from (⋆) that for all L ∈
M ∪M , SimpM (Ground(P)) |=N4 L. I.e. by Prop. 7 H
2
L
(M) is a minimal N4
model of P .
Sufficient condition: Let H2
L
(M) be a complete and minimal N4 model of P .
Let Let N = M ∩ BL. Since H2L(M) is complete, M = N ∪ N . Since H
2
L
(M)
is a minimal model of P , by Prop. 7, for all A ∈ N , P ∪ M˜ |=N4 A. There-
fore, for all A ∈ N , SimplM (Ground(P)) |=N4 A. By Prop. 8, for all A ∈ BL,
SimplM (Ground(P)) ∪ M˜ |= A. I.e. HL(N) is a stable model of P .
